Orchestrating governmental corporate social responsibility interventions through financial markets: The case of French socially responsible investment by Giamporcaro, S. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Giamporcaro, S., Gond, J-P. ORCID: 0000-0002-9331-6957 and O'Sullivan, N. 
(2019). Orchestrating governmental corporate social responsibility interventions through 
financial markets: The case of French socially responsible investment. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22885/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
Orchestrating Governmental Corporate Social Responsibility Interventions through 
Financial Markets: The Case of French Socially Responsible Investment 
 
 
Stéphanie Giamporcaro* 
Nottingham Trent University 
University of Cape Town 
Stephanie.giamporcaro@ntu.ac.uk 
 
 
Jean-Pascal Gond 
City, University of London 
Jean-Pascal.Gond.1@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Niamh O’Sullivan 
University of Nottingham 
niamh.osullivan@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
* Corresponding author 
 
Paper forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly 
Accepted for publication: September 22, 2019 
 
  
2 
Abstract 
Although a growing stream of research investigates the role of government in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), little is known about how governmental CSR interventions 
interact in financial markets. This article addresses this gap through a longitudinal study of 
the socially responsible investment (SRI) market in France. Building on the ‘CSR and 
government’ and ‘regulative capitalism’ literature, we identify three modes of governmental 
CSR intervention – regulatory steering, delegated rowing, and microsteering – and show 
how they interact through the two mechanisms of layering (the accumulation of 
interventions), and catalyzing (the alignment of interventions). Our findings 1) challenge the 
notion that, in the neoliberal order, governments are confined to steering market actors – 
leading and guiding their behavior – while private actors are in charge of rowing – providing 
products and services; 2) show how governmental CSR interventions interact and are 
orchestrated; and 3) provide evidence that governments can mobilize financial markets to 
promote CSR. 
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Financial markets, Government, Orchestration, 
Regulation, Socially responsible investment 
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Over the last two decades, we have witnessed the rise of a new neoliberal form of 
capitalism that is dominated by institutional investors such as pension funds and asset 
managers (Davis, 2009; Useem, 1996). This rise has been accompanied by private and public 
regulatory efforts to encourage corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the consideration of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues by financial actors (Giamporcaro & 
Gond, 2016; Marti & Scherer, 2016; Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012). In this context, the field 
of socially responsible investment (SRI) is a highly relevant domain in which to explore how 
national governments can experiment with and mobilize new forms of interventions (Djelic & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Kourula, Moon, Salles-Djelic, 
& Wickert, 2019). 
However, we know little about how governments promote the adoption of CSR within 
the context of financial markets. Moving beyond the perspective according to which CSR 
studies do not consider the role of government, a growing stream of studies investigate the 
relationship between CSR and government (Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Kourula et al., 2019). 
Despite its contribution to the analysis of national CSR policies (Albareda et al., 2008; 
Knudsen, 2018; Vallentin, 2015) or CSR-government relationships (Gond, Kang, & Moon, 
2011; Knudsen, Moon, & Slager, 2015), this research has little to say about how new 
governmental CSR interventions change or interact, or how financial market contexts shape 
such interactions. Overlooking how governmental interventions change and interact prevents 
scholars from analyzing their systemic impact, and thus obfuscates effective CSR policy 
design (Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Schneider & Scherer, 2019). In addition, neglecting finance 
as a “regulatory space” (Power, 2012: xiii) can misrepresent governmental capacities to 
regulate CSR given how financial markets weigh on governmental choices and policies 
(Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, & Spicer, 2016). 
In this article, we address these blind spots by studying how governmental CSR 
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interventions have evolved and interacted within the French financial market. We build on 
insights from the literature on CSR and government (Dentchev, Haezendonck, & van Balen, 
2017; Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Kourula et al., 2019; Schneider & Scherer, 2019) and 
Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) nautical analogy of the state engaging in steering, and other 
actors rowing, which is a central reference point in the literature on regulative capitalism 
(Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Levi-Faur, 2005). Steering 
interventions relate to “governing by setting the course, monitoring the direction and 
correcting deviations from the course set” (Crawford, 2006: 453), and are regarded as 
governmental actors’ prerogatives in a neoliberal context. Rowing interventions, on the other 
hand, relate to the enterprise, products and service provision, and are usually handled by 
private actors (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).1 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the role played by a range of French governmental 
actors (e.g., the state and state-owned investment groups) in the development of the national 
SRI market between 1997 and 2017 through interventions that targeted public companies as 
well as institutional investors. SRI practices involve the consideration and inclusion of 
traditional nonfinancial – otherwise known as ESG – information into investment decision-
making processes (Eurosif, 2018; Kurtz, 2008) with the purpose of enhancing public 
company CSR behavior and investment returns. With €920 billion assets under management 
(AuM) subject to the integration of ESG criteria within investment decisions, France is one of 
the most dynamic European SRI markets (Eurosif, 2018) and is characterized by the role of 
the state in the development of its market (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019; Crifo, Durand, & Gond, 
                                                 
1 The distinction between steering and rowing has been used in the literature on regulatory capitalism to evaluate 
the evolution of the role of the state and business in the provision of public goods. For instance, Levi-Faur 
(2005) suggests that, during the ‘Laissez-Faire Capitalism’ (1800s-1930s) period, steering and rowing were 
delivered by business; during the ‘Welfare State Capitalism’ (1940s-1970s) period, steering and rowing became 
the prerogatives of the state; and in the contemporary context of ‘regulatory capitalism’, steering is delivered by 
the state and rowing by market actors. As we will subsequently show empirically and theorize, we suggest that 
this distinction becomes blurred through the development of new modes of governmental CSR intervention. 
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2019). 
Drawing on historical and longitudinal sources of secondary data and 78 semistructured 
interviews, we analyze all of the governmental CSR interventions that occurred as the French 
SRI market developed between 1997 and 2017, and show how these interventions redefined 
the distribution of roles between governmental and private actors. That is, beyond classical 
forms of state-led steering and private actor-led rowing (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Levi-
Faur, 2005), we abductively (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010) identify new combinations of 
steering and rowing that blur the private/state dichotomy and allow for deeper, low-cost 
forms of state control of business conduct. Apart from regulatory steering – which is, the use 
of (hard) regulation without planning sanctions for noncompliance, we identify two other 
modes of intervention: delegated rowing – the mobilization of state-controlled organizations 
to change market actor behavior, and microsteering – the mobilization of technologies of 
governance such as labels or standards to micromanage market actor behavior. 
Adopting a social mechanism approach (Stinchcombe, 1991), we then analyze how 
interactions between modes of intervention become “transformed into some kind of collective 
outcome” (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998: 23). Here, we identify two main mechanisms that 
we refer to as layering and catalyzing. Layering relies on the complementarities between 
interventions and explains how the accumulation of, for example in our case, regulations on 
enhanced ESG data provision in the French marketplace supported the creation of new state-
owned actors and allowed them to experiment with new governance tools. The catalyzing 
mechanism relies on the alignment of interventions, and explains how coexisting 
interventions produce targeted pressure points, which extend regulatory depth and breadth 
and ultimately provoke a major shift in the market as well as SRI mainstreaming. 
By showing how governmental CSR interventions interacted within the French financial 
market, our analysis offers a threefold contribution to theory. First, we identify new modes of 
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governmental CSR interventions that recombine steering and rowing so that governments can 
enhance their influence, even though they operate within a neoliberal order. Second, we 
theorize two social mechanisms that explain how governmental CSR interventions interact 
and thus clarify how multiple interventions can be effectively orchestrated. Third, we 
highlight how governments mobilize financial intermediaries – such as public pension funds 
– to influence other market actors and identify some of the necessary market-related 
conditions for the deployment of effective governmental CSR interventions. 
 
GOVERNING CSR: CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Recognizing and Accounting for Governmental CSR Interventions 
Although CSR has traditionally been defined as corresponding to voluntary business 
activities (Barnett, Hartman, & Salomon, 2018; Carroll, 2008), where CSR means “going 
beyond obeying the law” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001: 117), a growing body of literature has 
shown that national governments can, and do, play a role in the adoption and formation of 
CSR behavior (Dentchev et al., 2017; Matten & Moon, 2004; Moon & Vogel, 2008). This 
move towards a “related perspective” (Knudsen & Moon, 2017: 15) that investigates how 
CSR and governmental activities overlap is consistent with legal scholars’ view that CSR not 
only happens beyond law but also through law (McBarnet, 2007; Zerk, 2006), notably 
through national procurement policies (McCrudden, 2007). In line with Schneider and 
Scherer (2019), we define governmental CSR interventions as “the system of public goals, 
strategies, laws, regulations, incentives, and funding priorities that governmental agencies, or 
their representatives, implement to motivate, facilitate and shape the CSR activities of 
business firms” (p. 4). In contrast to these authors, however, we refer to interventions rather 
than policies to stress that governmental actions in the CSR realm often take the form of soft, 
rather than hard, regulations that aim at nudging, as opposed to commanding, private actors. 
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Initial studies of ‘CSR and government’ have established the existing range of 
governmental CSR interventions. One stream of research has documented public policies 
related to CSR in different regions of the world (Albareda et al., 2008; Knudsen et al., 2015). 
For example, Steurer, Martinuzzi and Margula (2012) showcase the differences in themes and 
instruments of public policies focused on CSR across multiple European Union (EU) member 
states and find that Western member states (e.g., Denmark) are relatively more active than 
Eastern European countries (e.g., Poland) in the CSR regulatory space. On the other hand, 
Knudsen et al. (2015), analyzed changes in CSR policies in 22 EU member states and 
identified some convergence of CSR-related public policies within specific regions. To 
explain this cross-national diversity and to document governmental CSR interventions, a 
second stream of studies has developed typologies of the processes by which government and 
private actors interact around CSR (e.g., Fox, Ward, & Howard, 2002, Gond et al., 2011; 
Steurer, 2010). 
Together, this prior research suggests that governments operate as strategic actors in the 
CSR field (Gond et al., 2011; Moon & Vogel, 2008) – especially in Europe (Knudsen et al., 
2015). Governments can organize the delegation of CSR activities to private actors (Vallentin 
& Murillo, 2012), shape business behavior through a vast repertoire of instrumental means 
(from financial incentives to endorsements) and modes of interaction (from command and 
control regulation through to pure delegation), or focus on a variety of CSR-related domains 
(from suppliers’ procurement to corporate reporting and responsible investing). 
 
Explaining How Governmental CSR Interventions Work 
Recent research efforts focus on clarifying the assumptions underlying governmental 
CSR interventions (Knudsen & Moon, 2017) as well as the mechanisms by which they 
produce effects in the business world (Schneider & Scherer, 2019). This research does so by 
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incorporating insights from studies of regulatory capitalism (Braithwaite, 2011; Levi-Faur, 
2005), which find that state authorities still exert considerable power through the multiple 
regulatory activities they deploy (Wood & Wright, 2015). 
Knudsen and Moon (2017) provide a deeper and enriched understanding of 
governmental CSR policies as embedded within global forces (Polanyi, 1957), inherited 
policies and domestic institutions (Knudsen, 2018; Matten & Moon, 2008), and agential in 
the sense that CSR policies also result from the deliberate choice of governments to intervene 
in specific CSR domains. Building on this assumption of an embedded and agential approach 
to governmental CSR interventions allows us to conciliate the notion that government still 
matters despite globalization and to conceptualize various modes of governmental CSR 
interventions. Knudsen and Moon (2017), however, stress the lack of investigation and 
theorization regarding the interactions among multiple CSR policies that are deployed 
directly or indirectly by national governments. Prior empirical studies have usually adopted a 
cross-national comparative design (e.g., Albareda et al., 2008) or used ad hoc examples of 
governmental CSR-related practices to conceptualize typologies (e.g., Gond et al., 2011). As 
a result, this research has little to say about whether and how various governmental 
interventions in a specific country interact to shape a CSR domain or outcome. In particular, 
prior studies do not empirically investigate how governments diversify their use of CSR from 
a form of deregulation (e.g., delegating activities to private entities) to regulation (e.g., 
interventions that shape the activities of private entities), or even reregulation (e.g., turning 
soft laws into mandatory regulations). 
Schneider and Scherer (2019) have moved the analysis of ‘CSR and government’ one 
step further by conceptualizing the mechanisms by which governmental interventions shape 
market actors’ CSR behavior and specify their boundary conditions. Building on a definition 
of a social mechanism as “a process in a concrete system, such that it is capable of bringing 
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about or preventing some change in the system as a whole or in some of its subsystems” 
(Bunge, 1997: 414), they theorize four processes that make governmental CSR policies work. 
These processes are as follows: (a) the modification of available restrictions of business 
behavior through reregulation, the design of economic incentives or the creation of 
isomorphic pressures; (b) the shaping of actors’ preferences and values, for instance, in the 
context of interventions in deliberative collective decision making; (c) the provision of 
knowledge and resources; and (d) the empowerment of third parties to pressure firms towards 
engaging in CSR compliance. According to these authors, through these processes, 
“governmental CSR policies can help businesses overcome the barriers that the lack of 
sufficient motivation, capabilities, knowledge, and legitimacy pose” (Schneider & Scherer, 
2019: 38, emphasis added). 
Although a social mechanism approach is well suited to capturing the multiple 
interactions among governmental CSR interventions, Schneider and Scherer (2019) mainly 
focus on the mechanisms underlying each mode of governmental intervention and the 
identification of their specific boundary conditions. As a result, the mechanisms by which 
different modes of governmental CSR intervention interact remain unknown. In addition, 
even though Schneider and Scherer (2019) highlight boundary conditions that weigh on the 
mechanisms they identify, they overlook the particular conditions that financial markets 
create for firms. We now focus on these two limitations, as they motivate our empirical study. 
 
How do Governmental CSR Interventions Interact: Governing through Orchestration 
To holistically and longitudinally investigate the interactions between governmental CSR 
interventions, we build on concepts from the regulative capitalism literature (Abbott, 
Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2015, 2017; Braithwaite, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2005). Consistent with 
the assumption that governments are agential (Knudsen & Moon, 2017), we regard 
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governments as able to initiate “a wide range of directive and facilitative measures designed 
to convene, empower, support, and steer public and private actors engaged in regulatory 
activities” (Abbott & Snidal, 2009: 510). 
To capture the variety of governmental CSR interventions, we rely on the distinction 
between steering interventions – which relate to leading, thinking, directing and guiding, and 
rowing interventions – which relate to enterprise and service provision (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992: 25). This distinction has largely been used to account for a new division of labor 
between governments’ steering – through ‘hands off’ or ‘soft’ types of regulation – and 
private actors’ rowing – by providing services and technological innovation instead of the 
state (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Levi-Faur, 2005). In contrast, we regard steering and rowing 
as two useful categories to abductively make sense of current modes of governmental 
intervention that may blur this traditional distinction. 
We regard governments as coordinating CSR interventions through modes of rowing 
and/or steering and accordingly consider that a CSR policy ‘package’ can be ‘orchestrated’ 
by government. Orchestration is defined as “the mobilization of an intermediary by an 
orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal” (Abbott et al., 
2017: 722), and refers to the enrolment of several intermediaries – through soft governance 
means – to achieve specific political objectives. Although this notion has primarily been used 
to investigate how transnational governance organizations or nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) deploy their policy activities (Abbott et al., 2015, 2017), Henriksen and Ponte (2018) 
show its empirical relevance to investigate how governments coordinate many forms of 
interventions in the aviation industry. In this article, we focus on the mechanisms underlying 
the orchestration of governmental CSR interventions in financial markets. 
 
Making Governmental CSR Interventions Work in a Financialized Context: Governing 
11 
through Financial Markets 
In the context of financial capitalism (Davis, 2009), financial markets are both a central 
space in which national governments can shape the business adoption of CSR and a potential 
constraint that weighs on government and firm capacity to implement CSR policies. Prior 
governance studies suggest that financial markets per se can constitute a space for regulating 
corporate behavior (Engels, 2006) and that multiple forms of “discreet regulations” (Huault 
& Richard, 2012) take place within, if not through, practices such as corporate financial 
reporting (Botzem & Quack, 2006). Marti and Scherer (2016) also argue that the promotion 
of social justice and welfare by corporations requires governmental intervention in the 
financial sector. Schneider and Scherer’s (2019) analysis of the boundary conditions of 
governmental CSR interventions also indirectly point to financial markets as a context that 
shapes the capacity of governments and firms to successfully carry out such interventions. 
For instance, governmental legitimacy and capacity to engage neutrally in deliberative 
contexts may be restricted by the lack of credibility of governments in the eyes of financial 
actors, and firms’ willingness to provide resources to comply with CSR regulations may be 
reduced by pressures from their shareholders. 
Although prior studies of governmental CSR interventions mention SRI policies as a 
lever of action for government (e.g., Knudsen et al., 2015; Steurer et al., 2012), the 
mechanisms by which governments directly shape investors’ responsible behavior within 
financial markets – and, subsequently, indirectly shape corporations’ responsible behavior 
through financial markets – has been overlooked. In this article, we focus our analysis on 
how a range of governmental CSR interventions interact within the context of the 
construction of a national SRI market. Our analysis is guided by the following question: How 
do governmental CSR interventions operate and interact within financial markets in ways 
that shape firm behavior? 
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RESEARCH CONTEXT, DESIGN AND METHOD 
Case Selection 
To address this question, we draw from an in-depth historical, longitudinal case study of 
the French SRI market. Our analysis spans the 20-year development of this market from 1997 
to 2017. Although there were only a handful of French asset managers offering a small 
number of SRI products in the mid-1990s, the French SRI market has become one of the 
most developed in Europe since then (Crifo et al., 2019; Eurosif, 2018). In 2017, for example, 
a total of €920 billion AuM were subject to a form of ‘ESG integration’ (investment) 
strategy, compared to €338 billion in 2015 (Eurosif, 2018: 91).2 
This market is of specific relevance to our research question for two main reasons. First, 
it represents a case of relatively successful “SRI mainstreaming” (Crifo & Mottis, 2013: 579) 
in the sense that numerous, leading, French asset managers and the largest pension funds 
have now integrated SRI practices into their core business (Crifo et al., 2019). Such a shift is 
of significant global financial magnitude, as the French asset management industry is the 
second largest in Europe and the third largest in the world, after that of the USA and the UK 
(Eurosif, 2018). SRI can thus help us appreciate how national regulations operate through a 
market that is globally connected by nature. Second, this marketplace, like other European 
SRI markets (Steurer, Margula & Martinuzzi, 2008), has been influenced by heated political 
debates, such as that regarding the management of pension funds or employees’ savings 
(Crifo & Mottis, 2016), and is regarded as an established domain of governmental CSR 
                                                 
2 There are seven SRI strategies identified by Eurosif since 2012: Best in class, sustainability themed, norms-
based screening, engagement and voting, ESG integration, exclusions, and impact investing. France is the 
champion of ESG integration, a strategy which consists of taking into account ESG criteria within investment 
decisions. France is also the European leader in the best in class screening strategy, with €295 billion AuM 
subject to this approach in 2018, compared to €83 billion AuM in the Netherlands (EuroSIF, 2018). The best in 
class strategy amounts to systematically decreasing or increasing the weight of corporations and other listed 
entities within investment portfolios according to their corresponding ESG ratings (for a more detailed 
presentation of ESG investment strategies, see also: EuroSIF, 2018). 
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intervention (Steurer et al., 2012). Prior work has also highlighted the role played by the 
French state and public actors in this market’s early development (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019; 
Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). 
 
Data Collection 
To capture the history of governmental CSR interventions in the French SRI market, we 
collected data from multiple sources that played complementary roles in our analytical 
process. Appendix A provides a detailed presentation of our data sources and of how they 
were used. 
 
Historical and Secondary Data 
Because we adopt a longitudinal approach to the analysis of the role of the government 
in the French SRI domain, sources of secondary data played a central role in our analytical 
strategy (Langley, 1999). First, we collected newspaper articles about SRI in France using the 
Lexis Nexis Academic database and key terms related to SRI (e.g., responsible investment or 
ethical investment) and the most prominent actors from the field (e.g., leading SRI funds or 
investment firms). These data helped to build a detailed chronology of the stages of SRI 
development in France over the twenty-year period in question. Second, we collected all of 
the available, quantified information about the development and transformation of this market 
from 1997 to 2017 from the websites of organizations such as Novethic or Eurosif (European 
Social Investment Forum). Third, we collected all of the governmental reports related to SRI, 
that is, the documents about the ESG policies of the two main public pension funds, as well 
as publicly available information related to the state-backed labels for SRI. Fourth, our 
analysis was also informed by prior academic studies of SRI in France (e.g., Arjaliès, 2010; 
Crifo et al., 2019; Déjean, Gond & Leca, 2004; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). 
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Interviews 
Another important source of information to document the development of the French SRI 
market and the deployment of governmental interventions was a rich set of 78 semistructured 
interviews conducted with prominent SRI actors between 2000 and 2017. Forty-eight 
interviews were completed between 2000 and 2011. We used these earlier interviews to 
complete and support the secondary archival and historical data to build our narrative. Thirty 
interviews were completed after 2012 and helped to retrospectively document the effects of 
the previous period (1997-2011). This second batch of interviews helped us document the in 
vivo effect of the interactions among the different modes of governmental CSR intervention 
since 2012. 
We count among our interviewees the key actors involved in French SRI “chains of 
finance” (Arjaliès et al., 2017), such as asset managers (n = 42), state representatives, public 
asset owners and state-related organizations (n = 23), actors from the leading French CSR 
rating agency (Arese/Vigeo), and other stakeholders (n = 13), such as trade unions and 
professional associations (see Appendix B for more details about our interviewees and the 
timeline of the interview campaigns). Through “snowballing” (Biernarcki & Wardof, 1981: 
141) and our increased familiarity with key actors in the field over the years, we accessed 
interviewees who played a central, and sometimes prolonged, role in the public 
administration of and lobbying for the development of the market. Our discussion with these 
interviewees allowed us to reconstruct elements of the “closed-door politics” that underlined 
the design of SRI regulations in the shadow of different ministries between 1997 and 2017. 
 
Participant Observation 
Our access to central field actors was also facilitated by the personal ties developed by 
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one of the authors who worked at an organization that played a crucial role in the 
development of the French SRI market between 2002 and 2008. This author was formally 
employed to collect and analyze data about the SRI market. Through this position, the author 
attended high-level discussions about the design and structure of pension fund SRI activities 
between 2005 and 2007 and observed numerous political dynamics associated with these 
activities. Many of the contacts developed over this intensive period of field immersion 
became acquaintances who facilitated further access to SRI actors, who provided open and 
unpolished insider viewpoints on the highly politicized organizational interactions between 
private (e.g., asset managers) and public (e.g., state pension fund, ministry) actors during this 
period. Informal conversations with these interviewees helped us to advance our knowledge 
of the political dynamics deployed in this market. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
To investigate the role of the government in the making of the French SRI market 
between 1997 and 2017, we combined qualitative (Yin, 2009) and longitudinal data analysis 
methods (Langley, 1999), which followed a three-stage process. 
 
Stage 1: Mapping the SRI Market Development through Temporal Bracketing 
We first built a detailed chronology of the key events that marked the development of 
SRI in France over the whole period, identifying the roles of a variety of different 
stakeholders (asset owners, asset managers, government bodies, CSR rating agencies). 
Through this process, we could track governmental CSR interventions over the twenty-year 
period and identify multiple instances of interactions between SRI market development and 
global forces, such as rising concern about climate change or the emergence of European 
regulation about SRI. We also relied upon numerous quantitative indicators to track the 
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development of this market in terms of the AuM number of the SRI products developed and 
the number of asset managers offering SRI products. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
evolution of the French SRI market, highlighting its three periods of development. First, from 
1997 to 2007 (Period 1), there was continuous growth of the French SRI market, with an 
increasing number of asset managers participating (from 7 to 47) and a sharp increase in the 
number of SRI products being offered (from a dozen in 1997 to more than 100 in 2007). 
Numerous changes in the national legal context drove SRI market growth during this first 
period, which can be referred to as the “construction of a French SRI regulatory 
springboard”. Second, between 2008 and 2011 (Period 2), we witnessed a phase of legal 
extension and mainstream appropriation. Despite the 2008 financial crisis, there was a sharp 
increase in the number of SRI products offered in France (Les Echos, 2009) and a steady 
increase in AuM subject to ESG criteria in investment decision making, signifying the 
“mainstreaming of SRI” among leading French asset managers at the time (Crifo et al., 2019; 
Crifo & Mottis, 2016). Finally, between 2012 and 2017 (Period 3), we witnessed SRI 
mainstreaming in the market, which our interviewees referred to as a “SRI big bang”. In 
particular, since 2013, the SRI market in France grew exponentially in terms of AuM subject 
to ESG criteria (from €200 to €322 billion) and the number of new SRI funds created (from 
250 to 439 funds). This upsurge in the market derived from the appropriation of ESG 
investment criteria by major institutional investors between 2006 and 2012 as well as 
governmental interventions. 
Several of our expert interviewees validated this chronology, which we used as an 
overarching analytical template to identify when governmental CSR interventions took place 
and what their main effects in the financial marketplace were (see Table 2). Once we 
identified this pattern of French SRI market development, we focused on how governmental 
CSR interventions helped to create such mainstream acceptance of SRI in the French 
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financial market. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Stage 2: Abduction of Modes of Governmental Intervention 
Based on our interviews and secondary data, we grouped the data we acquired about 
French governmental CSR interventions together and analyzed these through typologies of 
CSR interventions proposed in the literature (e.g., Gond et al., 2011; Knudsen & Moon, 
2017). Although we initially found Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) distinction between 
steering and rowing relevant to describe governmental interventions, through further analysis, 
it appeared to be too generic for the empirical complexity of the French government’s 
interventions in the SRI domain, especially as many of these interventions blended 
characteristics of both steering and rowing. 
Therefore, to make sense of this “anomaly” (Behfar & Okhuysen, 2018: 329) and to 
more accurately capture the governmental CSR interventions in our case, we engaged in 
abductive reasoning (Kekotivi & Mantere, 2010) and analyzed our data again to identify 
specific combinations or forms of steering and rowing. First, beyond the classical state 
regulatory steering intervention through direct (or hard) regulation to guide market actors 
(but without planning sanctions for noncompliance), we identified several indirect forms of 
state interventions deployed through state-governed organizations that blended elements of 
steering and rowing, and focused on the empowerment and enrolment of state-owned market 
actors to deliver CSR policies. We refer to these as delegated rowing interventions. Second, 
we isolated a third type of intervention that corresponded to a ‘hands-on’ form of steering by 
private or public actors, and notably took the form of the state capture of SRI labels, which 
we refer to as microsteering interventions. Microsteering corresponds to governmental CSR 
interventions that involve the government’s active mobilization of soft power and 
‘technologies of governance’, such as labels, standards, or awards. These technologies share 
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the property of micromanaging actor behavior. Table 1 provides the definition and 
supplementary illustrations of these three modes of governmental CSR intervention. 
 
Stage 3: Identification of the Social Mechanisms Explaining How Governmental CSR 
Interventions Interact 
We then used the analytical categories induced in Stage 2 and our temporal brackets 
identified in Stage 1 to build a chronology of these three modes of governmental CSR 
intervention. Table 2 summarizes our analysis by showing how the different modes of 
intervention were mobilized at each period of SRI development and distinguishes the main 
actions corresponding to the intervention from their effects on the market. Here, we realized 
that some forms of governmental CSR intervention played a more crucial role in explaining 
the transformation of the market than others because the magnitude of their effects was 
stronger, according to our interviewees (see Table 2). 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
We then revisited our qualitative data to explore how various forms of interactions 
between, or combinations of, the three modes of governmental CSR intervention could 
explain the effects we observed (see Table 2). Following Schneider and Scherer (2019), we 
adopted a “social mechanism” approach (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Stinchcombe, 1991) 
to make sense of the interactions between governmental CSR interventions and focused on 
the recurrent interactions among governmental CSR interventions, within each period. 
Moving back and forth between, on the one hand, the effects of governmental CSR 
interventions and, on the other hand, their timeline, we realized the importance of the 
diachronic or synchronic occurrence of these interventions and identified two core underlying 
mechanisms explaining their holistic impact. The first mechanism is layering, which points to 
the complementarity between these interventions through a process of accumulation. This 
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process could be metaphorically seen as a form of “legal sedimentation”. That is, each 
intervention adds a layer of regulation, which creates a context that produces specific effects 
on market actors (e.g., making CSR calculable, experimenting with new forms of 
governance). The second mechanism we identified is catalyzing, which relates to the co-
occurrence of interventions targeting distinct categories of market actors, making all of them 
aware of an issue at the same time and aligning their behavior around the issue. The 
simultaneous interactions among interventions reinforce their impact by operating as a 
catalyst to SRI mainstreaming within the financial marketplace. Revisiting our chronology in 
light of these two mechanisms, we realized that layering took place during the first two 
periods (1997-2011) and catalyzing mainly during the last period (2012-2017), and that both 
mechanisms involved the combination of distinct modes of intervention. The overarching 
influence of these mechanisms is depicted in Figure 2. To describe how these mechanisms 
operate, we developed a detailed narrative that explains the three modes of governmental 
CSR intervention and their interactions. This narrative forms the basis of our findings section. 
 
ORCHESTRATING AN SRI ‘BIG BANG’: LAYERING AND CATALYZING 
We now show in detail how our three modes of governmental CSR intervention built on 
and complemented each other over time through layering and ultimately aligned the behavior 
of multiple actors through a series of combined interventions that acted as a catalyzing 
mechanism for SRI in France. Overall, these mechanisms enabled SRI mainstreaming within 
the French financial marketplace (see Figure 2). 
 
Layering: Accumulation of Complementary Regulatory Steering and Delegated Rowing 
Interventions 
Dominant Modes of Governmental CSR Intervention in Periods 1 and 2 (1997-2011) 
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Central to the early development of the French SRI market were the regulatory steering 
and delegated rowing modes of intervention. Regulatory steering is a mode of governmental 
intervention used by states and ministries to shape actor behavior through the promulgation 
of laws and the application of decrees. This mode departs from traditional “command and 
control” approaches to regulation (MacBarnet, 2007), as the legal frameworks it produces are 
normally only loosely constraining. These laws do not usually specify sanctions in the case of 
noncompliance by targeted actors and leave room for multiple forms of operationalization. 
Between 1997 and 2011 (Periods 1 & 2), regulatory steering progressively enhanced the 
capacity of a wider range of SRI market actors (first corporations and then asset managers 
and public asset owners) to report under the state’s ESG disclosure requirements with 
increased precision and depth over time. 
Delegated rowing corresponds to governmental interventions that rely on the 
mobilization of state-led organizations to indirectly regulate the behavior of other market 
actors. Although the responsive capitalism literature regards rowing, in the 21st century, as a 
prerogative – which is usually delegated to the private sector by public actors (Levi-Faur, 
2005) – we found that the French state engaged in rowing itself, albeit indirectly. That is, 
between 1997 and 2011 (Periods 1 & 2), the state pooled financial, political and institutional 
resources into new state-led organizations dedicated to SRI and reformed existing 
organizations by decree with the aim of advancing SRI within the French financial market. 
Regulatory steering enabled this delegated rowing through the creation of state-led asset 
owners Fonds de Reserve des Retraites (FRR) and Établissement de Retraite Additionnelle de 
la Fonction Publique (ERAFP), as well as the mobilization of existing state-owned 
investment actors such as Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) and their newly created 
subsidiary (Novethic); these were empowered by the nascent and favorable SRI regulatory 
environment to act as socially responsible “experts” or “investors” in the French financial 
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market. 
 
How Governmental CSR Interventions Interacted in Periods 1 and 2 (1997-2011) 
Layering operated first through an accumulation of regulatory steering interventions that 
enabled the extension of the number and type of actors subject to compulsory ESG reporting. 
Over the years, the legal requirements to report on ESG issues moved from corporations in 
the 2001 NRE (New Economic Regulations) law to employee savings vehicles in the 2001 
Fabius law on voluntary employee savings, and eventually to asset managers in the 2010 
Grenelle II law (see Table 2) – which, for the first time obliged asset managers to disclose 
detailed ESG information (Les Echos, 2012). 
There was the NRE [Law] for the companies that turned into the [Grenelle Law Article] 
225 and you also had the [Article] 224, which was not super clear but also required 
from asset managers some ESG reporting. We, asset managers, were asked even before 
the asset owners to do this. […] The French system channels pressure because the state 
creates a law for each of the players involved, and this creates a competitive 
environment for market actors. (Head of SRI Research, Asset Manager 26, 
interview 63)3 
In 2013, a study concluded that 90% of asset managers targeted by Grenelle II Article 
224 were able to provide general information about their SRI strategies and a list of their 
investment funds adopting an SRI approach.4 As a whole, these regulatory steering 
interventions by the French state during Periods 1 and 2 forced targeted market actors 
(companies and investors) to incorporate ESG issues into their activities, so that they could 
adequately disclose ESG data to CSR rating providers, investors, and other stakeholders, such 
as trade unions and civil society. 
While none of these legal frameworks imposed strict reporting formats, the regulative 
power of these ‘soft’ interventions grew as they accumulated, as did the competitive ‘peer 
                                                 
3 Please refer to Appendix B for more details about the interviews. 
4 For more details see: https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/prc3a9sentation-
novc3a9thic-article-2241.pdf, accessed May 2016. 
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pressure’ associated with their implementation among the key market actors involved. Hence, 
the consecutive ESG-related laws reinforced each other by extending the scope of the actors 
involved along the SRI value chain while at the same time deepening the nature of their ESG 
disclosure requirements. 
A second central component of layering was the French state’s combination of regulatory 
steering and indirect rowing through its major influence on CDC, which is the state-owned 
investment group, whose chief executive officer (CEO) is chosen by the French president and 
described by some interviewees as “the financial right-hand man” of the French state. 
Through multiple application decrees, this organization became more closely involved with 
the administrative management of two newly created public asset owners: the FRR and 
ERAFP. 
The FRR was established by the pension funds law of July 2001 (law 2001-624) and is a 
buffer reserve fund designed to protect the French public retirement system in case of 
financial shortcomings. The ERAFP, created in August 2003 (law 2003-775), is an additional 
French public service pension scheme whose CEO is appointed by the joint order of the 
ministers in charge of the public service, the national budget, and social security. 
In 2005, the ERAFP’s first action consisted of implementing an ambitious SRI policy to 
integrate ESG criteria into all of the scheme’s investment decisions. In the same year, the 
FRR launched its first call for tenders to select asset managers for its SRI funds, followed by 
the first ERAFP SRI equity call in 2006. These two calls for tender attracted bids from 40 and 
30 international and local asset managers, respectively (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). The 
FRR subsequently delegated its SRI investment to 6 asset managers, whereas the ERAPF 
entrusted its investment portfolio to two prominent French asset managers: BNP Paribas and 
IDEAM; the latter a subsidiary of Credit Agricole Asset Management, which, in 2010, 
merged with another prominent French management house to form Amundi – the biggest 
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French asset manager. In designing two giant asset owners – accounting for €34.5 (FRR) and 
€4.7 (ERAFP) billion AuM by the end of 2007, who adopted ambitious SRI policies and 
mandates from scratch, the French government increased the total AuM subject to ESG 
criteria in the financial market while simultaneously signaling its long-term commitment to 
SRI to the asset management industry. 
The CDC described by interviewees as “being an incubator for SRI” for providing 
operational and administrative support to the FRR and ERAFP was also tasked in 2007 with 
managing the IRCANTEC5 – another public pension scheme – which was earmarked by the 
French government to become an SRI investor: 
At the CDC, one of our main internal clients is IRCANTEC. IRCANTEC administrators 
wanted all IRCANTEC assets to be managed with SRI principles. The first mission for us 
was to define what that means. An SRI charter was defined. Our job is to implement it 
with the help of the external asset managers we work with. If you compare us with the 
FRR, which started its SRI program in 2002-2003, and ERAFP in 2005-2006, we started 
later in 2007. There is competition between public asset owners but of a benevolent kind. 
Our goal is to catch up and to be even better. (Head of RI, Asset Owner 3, interview 70) 
In addition, in 2008, the Economic Modernisation Act (Law 2008-776) marked a 
significant turning point in the French SRI market, as it repositioned the public investment 
group, CDC, as an SRI investor; which the following statement from CDC’s website, 
published directly after this act launched in 2008, outlines: 
The CDC is a long-term investor: It analyses the profit of its holdings portfolio on a 
long-term horizon. This long-term horizon leads the CDC to behave as a SRI investor. 
(CDC Investment Doctrines, December 2008, available on the CDC website) 
In general, this revised legal framework confirmed the already well-acknowledged 
prominence of these state-led organizations in the development of the French SRI market (see 
Table 1). From 2001 onwards, the CDC, FRR, ERAFP, and IRCANTEC developed their SRI 
competencies, strategies and products but also delegated many financial services and 
products – through market intermediaries and asset managers – that they were not willing to 
                                                 
5 In the French language, IRCANTEC stands for Institution de Retraites Complémentaires pour les Agents Non 
Titulaire de l’État et les Collectivités publiques. 
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generate directly. 
These large public asset owners led the French financial industry towards more SRI 
professionalization, not only through their multiple calls for asset manager ESG tenders but 
also through their direct influence on the SRI agenda itself, notably through voting and 
engagement with companies on ESG matters (Heads of RI and ESG analysts, Asset Owners 
1, 2, 3 interviews 66 to 70; FRR, 2017). These asset owners delicately built their ability to 
govern the conduct of their asset managers with regard to SRI matters. 
If you want to have an ESG impact on the companies, the most efficient way to go about 
this is to hassle your asset managers regularly. It is a leverage phenomenon that can 
have multiple effects. We have more than 50 asset managers working for us. Our main 
leverage on the companies is to get all our asset managers to engage in ESG with them. 
(Head of RI, Asset Owner 1, interview 67) 
By applying “soft touch” regulatory steering through laws and decrees, the state created 
or pushed existing actors to integrate ESG factors into their investment operations. 
Additionally, this approach made it possible for them to form a pioneering “club” of public 
assets owners engaged in SRI (Head of RI, Asset Owner 1, interview 68) who were able to 
influence investee company CSR performance in a delegated fashion through their asset 
managers. 
In addition, the CDC was instrumental in indirectly influencing market actors’ behavior 
through its role in the consolidation of the informational infrastructure of the SRI market. 
At the CDC, we are currently working on developing market tools such as ESG ratings 
for companies and SRI funds. […] I am convinced that financial markets will 
progressively integrate this broader approach to assess economic performance. (Daniel 
Lebegue, CEO of CDC; interviewed in La Tribune, October 2002) 
That is, before becoming legally recognized as an SRI investor in 2008, the CDC 
financially supported two key ESG calculative agencies: Arese in 1999, which became 
Vigeo, the national CSR ratings agency, in 2002, and Novethic in 2001, which has its very 
own subsidiary dedicated to providing CSR and SRI information and research (Giamporcaro 
& Gond, 2016). Vigeo enabled the state to exert indirect pressure on companies and asset 
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managers, as it produced company CSR ratings and benchmarks to incentivize companies to 
improve their CSR strategies and performance and simultaneously equipped asset managers 
with a calculative device to enhance their investment decision making and SRI products. 
Similarly, Novethic stimulated asset managers to increase and compare their SRI 
expertise. Through the support of the CDC and based on the legitimacy and success of its SRI 
ratings system and market reports (Giamporcaro, 2006), Novethic transformed its SRI ratings 
system into a certification system in October 2009 – which is known as the “Novethic SRI 
label” (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019). This scheme required asset managers to pay fees to enter 
the certification process to obtain the label. Novethic equipped the label with an “Independent 
Advisory Council”, including representatives of civil society organizations as well as public 
and private stakeholders. To obtain the label, French asset managers had to provide details 
about their SRI management approach; report on the ESG characteristics of their portfolio; 
provide clarification on the exact use of derivative instruments considered non-SRI 
compatible since the 2008 financial crisis; and, more contentiously, disclose the full list of 
portfolio holdings for any labeled fund at least once a year (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019). This 
approach to labeling opened up the “black-box” of SRI products available to retail clients, as 
it forced asset managers to publicly disclose their SRI policies and activities. 
When the Novethic label came in, it was ambitious but necessary. You knew as an asset 
manager that you would need to prove that you were “walking the talk” in order to get 
in. The asset managers operating in France largely followed the Novethic label. (Head 
of SRI, Asset Manager 5, interview 55) 
 
Overall Impact of Layering in the Financial Marketplace 
In sum, throughout periods 1 and 2 (1997-2011), the French state continuously 
empowered state-led organizations, such as the CDC, public pension funds, Vigeo and 
Novethic, through the combined mobilization of regulatory steering and indirect rowing 
interventions. These interventions complemented each other so that state interventions 
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resulted in the progressive extension of the French SRI market due to the large size of some 
of these actors, such as the newly created public funds FRR and ERAFP (direct effect of 
regulatory steering) or the public asset owners, such as the CDC and IRCANTEC (indirect 
effect of regulatory steering and delegated rowing), that were “converted” to SRI. 
These multiple “layers of regulation” subsequently enabled various relational and 
“isomorphic” forms of market regulation (Schneider & Scherer, 2019). First, the adoption of 
SRI strategies and practices by dominant public asset owners created peer pressure for other 
asset owners, as illustrated by the case of AGIRC-ARCCO (the national complementary 
retirement scheme for private sector employees), which jumped onto the SRI bandwagon in 
2006 (see Les Echos, 2006). Second, these state-governed asset owners directly shaped the 
behavior of private assets managers through the numerous SRI mandates they required. Local 
and international asset managers began to reorganize themselves – through the creation of 
dedicated SRI services and competencies – to compete for these pioneering SRI tenders by 
large, public asset owners. Third, through the delegated rowing that created calculative 
agencies and regulatory steering regarding ESG disclosures, the French state shaped a 
competitive market environment around SRI. 
Hence, in 1997, only 7 asset managers supplied a marginal amount of SRI products; in 
2012, 53 asset managers (including the largest, Amundi) were actively involved in the 
management of more than 250 SRI products (see Figure 1). In addition, since 2003, French 
asset managers eager to be taken seriously and to benchmark well against their peers sought 
to obtain a good Novethic SRI rating. After 2009, asset managers applied to be awarded the 
Novethic SRI label for their SRI funds. In addition, public asset owners began to complement 
their nascent SRI expertise, by using the services of organizations such as Novethic and 
Vigeo, which were created through delegated rowing. For example, in 2006, the ERAPF and 
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FRR6 (followed later by IRCANTEC) used Vigeo – as well as other CSR rating agencies – to 
measure the ESG quality of portfolios managed by delegated asset managers. During the 
same period, Novethic was tasked by the CDC to act as an internal SRI consultant for the 
ERAFP (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). Ultimately, this market environment – constituted 
through the layering of multiple, complementary governmental interventions – enabled the 
emergence of a “SRI Big Bang” in France through catalyzing. 
 
Catalyzing: Alignment of Regulatory Steering and Microsteering for SRI Mainstreaming 
Dominant Modes of Governmental CSR Intervention in Period 3 (2012-2017) 
Microsteering involves the active mobilization of “soft” governmental modes of 
intervention or “technologies of governance”, such as labels, calculative devices (Miller, 
1992), or standards (Reineke, Manning & Von Hagen, 2012; Slager et al., 2012), which 
“micromanage” market actor ESG behavior (see Table 1). In our context, microsteering 
mainly takes the form of SRI labels created with stringent criteria to determine what products 
and services can be considered “socially responsible”. Through the evolution of the French 
SRI market between 1997 and 2012, labor unions, market intermediaries such as Novethic, 
and asset managers were directly involved in SRI label construction (see Table 2). Central to 
our analysis, however, is the fact that, between 2012 and 2017, the French government 
intervened in order to capture, and thus “legally solidify”, some of these labels, which 
became, by decree, the property of the state in December 2015 and January 2016 (see 
Table 2). 
It is the first time the French state created a label for a financial product. It never 
interfered this way with investment before. (Head of SRI, Asset Manager 5, interview 65) 
In parallel to microsteering, which emerged as a dominant mode of intervention at the 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the FRR press release on hiring CSR rating agencies to measure the quality of its investment 
portfolio: http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/061130_extra-financial-reporting_selection-of-
providers_Nov_30_2006.pdf, accessed May 2016. 
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time, this second stage of market development was also characterized by the extension of 
regulatory steering. The deployment of Green Growth Law Article173-VI (2012-17, see 
Table 2) – referred to by practitioners as “the 173” and passed in August 2015 – considerably 
extended the French state’s regulatory steering perimeter. 
I think that everything changed in 2015 with the Ministry of Environment, which pushed 
the Green Growth Law and Article 173. This is when you realize that the willingness of 
the regulator changes everything. When I talk about a ‘Big Bang’, this is what I meant, 
that the French state had been the essential trigger of all of the changes that we are 
experiencing today. (Head of SRI, Asset Manager 21, interview 53) 
Microsteering and regulatory steering modes of intervention became fully aligned when 
Article 173-VI passed in December 2015, which stated that any commitment to labels 
pertaining to the achievement of ESG and climate objectives need to be reported upon both 
by asset managers and asset owners.7 
 
How Governmental CSR Interventions Interacted in Period 3 (2012-2017) 
To understand the catalyzing mechanism that aligned and strengthened SRI market 
forces, it is vital to unpack the series of events that led the French government to co-opt and 
then take over the microtechnology of governance that was experimented with by labor 
unions in the early 2000s, i.e., labels (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). This analysis will be 
followed by a discussion of the genesis of Article 173-VI, which builds on the French state’s 
SRI regulatory steering effort deployed from 1997-2012 requiring mandatory reporting by 
public and private asset owners regarding their exposure to carbon risks for the first time. 
In July 2012, the Novethic SRI label was singled out as a form of greenwashing by the 
                                                 
7 The full text of the Article 173-VI decree is available on open access(accessed, May 2016): 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031740341&categorieLien=id. See 
also the following English translation of the section of the article relating to the reporting commitments of the 
market actors subject to it: “any commitment of the entity, or certain undertakings for collective investment 
mentioned in 1o of I, to a charter, code or initiative, or label obtained for taking into account criteria relating to 
compliance with environmental, social and quality of governance objectives. Summary description of the 
charter, code, initiative or label”. 
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most famous investigative journalism TV show in France.8 During the show, the Head of SRI 
funds at Amundi and the CEO of Novethic, were set upon in front of the camera by the 
reporters and exposed as being unable to explain why a corporation involved in a recent oil 
leak was still part of Amundi’s SRI funds (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019). Novethic reacted by 
increasing the stringency of its SRI label in September 2012 and raising the proportion of 
SRI-related exclusions from investment portfolios that was needed to bring the label to 15% 
(in comparison to the fund’s investment benchmark). As a result, only 109 funds obtained 
this new label, in contrast with 156 the previous year (Le Monde, 2012). Subsequently, 
Amundi rapidly ceased its application for the label and announced that its SRI process would 
now be certified by another organization that did not necessarily require reliance on 
exclusion-based criteria (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019). This Amundi/Novethic dispute (Le 
Monde, 2013) created an unresolved chasm in the French SRI market and marked the entry of 
the Ministry of Environment9and the Ministry of Finance into the debate, which initiated the 
French state’s capture of the label development process and produced an unparalleled mode 
of microsteering regulation. 
In June 2013, one year after a state multiparty environmental conference that hinted that 
a public SRI label was in the pipeline, the necessity of creating a “unique and enriched SRI 
label” was reiterated by a public report commissioned by the Ministry of Environment and 
the Ministry of Finance (Brovelli, Drago, & Molinié, 2013).10 The idea of a governmental 
SRI label was further discussed during the French Banking and Finance Conference for the 
Energy Transition the following year in June 2014. This discussion led to a series of 
                                                 
8 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7YPCRVx9hA. First accessed May 2016. See the minutes 
41 to 51. 
9 This ministry was consecutively labelled the ‘Ministry of Ecology, Sustainability and Energy’ and ‘the 
Ministry of Environment, Energy and the Sea’ under the Hollande Government. We refer to it as the ‘Ministry 
of Environment’ to facilitate the readability of the narrative. 
10 This ministry was labelled ‘the Ministry of Economy and Finance’ under the Hollande government. We refer 
to it as the ‘Ministry of Finance’ to facilitate the readability of the narrative. 
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conferences, events, and workshops during which numerous private and public stakeholders 
intervened to shape the criteria of the label, as described retrospectively by the CEO of one of 
the leading French SRI asset managers: 
Flagship examples of how regulation can strengthen the attractiveness of commercial 
activities, and be designed in collaboration with private actors, come to mind [...]. In 
September 2012, during ‘the Environmental Conference’ called by the Hollande 
President, the government announced its willingness to create a public SRI label. […] 
We immediately wanted to work with the government [on this]. This process spread over 
two years and ran through some difficulties, but we eventually reached a consensus, and 
the creation of two public labels: The public SRI label under the stewardship of the 
Finance Ministry; and the ecological transition label under the stewardship of the 
Ministry of Environment. (Philippe Zaouati, CEO of Mirova, extract from his book: 
Green Finance Starts in Paris, 2018) 
Following three years of intense stakeholder lobbying, two distinct yet stringent labels 
were launched officially by ministerial decrees: ‘the [financing] energy and ecological 
transition for climate’ (TEEC) label in December 2015 (decree 2015-1615) and the ‘public 
SRI label’ in January 2016 (decree 2016-10).11 
This is really the moment [2013-2015] when we all started to lobby the government. If 
you [the state] really want to create a public SRI label, this is up to you, but this is not 
going to help you to finance the ecological transition; you will need another label for 
this, a specialized one. (Novethic, CEO, interview 75) 
Central to this process was the tension among leading French asset managers with 
competing views on the “SRI exclusion ratio” to be adopted for labeled funds. 
When the Ministry of Finance took over the public SRI label, the objective was to reach a 
regulatory situation where it has to make sure that SRI is really doing what it says it 
does, but in the meantime, the ministry had also to deal with the negative and antagonist 
energy of some market players in order to build something more positive. (High Level 
Public Servant, Ministry of Finance, interview 72) 
The public SRI label is a good illustration of how microsteering facilitated greater 
regulation of private actors, as the capture of this governance tool allowed the French 
                                                 
11 The full text of both documents can be accessed on the French legislative platform (first accessed May 2016). 
For the Ministry of Environment’s TEEC label decree and the Ministry of Finance’s SRI public label decree, 
see, respectively: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031593158&categorieLien=id 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031800648&categorieLien=id. 
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government to reshape investors’ internal investment processes in a relatively “low cost” 
way. This label also capitalized on prior microsteering interventions from other market 
actors, such as the Novethic SRI label, but it also strengthened some of their requirements by, 
for example, including a 20% SRI-related exclusion rate on investment portfolios instead of 
15%, requiring the adoption and implementation of a shareholder ESG engagement policy, 
and requiring the measurement of SRI portfolios’ positive ESG impact.12 In addition, the 
label broadened the scope of previous microsteering efforts, even though there was an 
absence of NGOs in the governance of the label, and hence, the label’s independence was 
still contested: 
Because the majority of stakeholders focused only on fighting about the SRI exclusion 
rate of the label, we could get the elements we wanted within the label about shareholder 
engagement and detailed ESG impact measurement—two things that were absent from 
the prior Novethic label. My only regret is that NGOs are not represented in the 
executive committee. (Trade Union, CIES Representative, interview 78) 
By stepping into the process of label development and mediating the conflict between 
leading asset managers, the French state significantly extended the depth of its intervention in 
the market but in a way that was well received by the French investment industry: 
The willingness of the French state to show that it wants to promote SRI is very clear. 
The public SRI label reference document is testimony to this. This is going very far. This 
is a very stringent system. (SRI Product Specialist, Asset Manager 12, interview 59) 
Today, the public SRI label remains the property of the French state, and its current 
administration rests with the Ministry of Finance, while state-accredited third-party providers 
are in charge of the auditing process and are remunerated directly by asset managers without 
                                                 
12 To obtain the label, SRI asset managers have to demonstrate that, over the entire investment universe used to 
construct their funds, they have excluded at least 20% of the worst performing corporations, based on their ESG 
rating (see the Legifrance links in footnote 12). Accordingly, the average ESG rating of their portfolio, should 
be higher than the average ESG rating of the investment universe of the fund. 
12 French CSR governmental interventions were accelerated by the unique window of opportunity offered by 
hosting the COP 21 (Conference of Parties) climate change negotiations in Paris in December 2015. Article 2 of 
the Paris Climate Change Agreement stipulates that financial actors should participate “in making financial 
flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development”. See: 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf (accessed May 
2016). 
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any further state interference. 
The French state not only extended the depth but also the breath of its ability to govern 
responsible business conduct in Period 3 (2012-2017). The mobilization around the drafting 
of Article 173-VI is testimony to the work of the French Parliament, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Environment at the time. From 2012, the French state – through the 
Ministry of Environment and soon after the Ministry of Finance – engaged in the analysis of 
how to facilitate the energy transition, which led the state to take a special interest in what 
had been developed by asset managers, public asset owners, and service providers – such as 
Novethic and Vigeo – who were engaged in SRI. As one of our leading asset manager 
interviewees involved in this deliberative process recognized, the French government “was 
smart”, as it “met with all the SRI players and got them to talk about all the pioneering things 
they were doing”; the passage of Article 173-VI (see Table 1) and the operationalization of 
its decree were organized through an ongoing dialogue with investors: 
Designing the 173-VI decree was tricky, in the sense that it needed to be kept politically 
meaningful without losing half the actors in the process. […] You cannot force the 
mainstream finance actors to become SRI actors straightaway [...]. But, if you steer the 
conversation towards the idea that ‘SRI players have their own motivation but there is a 
couple of things they understood, you could learn from them’. You can also start to ask 
‘Did you think about your ESG objectives?’ The 173-VI decree is about forcing this 
strategic reflection about what ‘ESG objectives’ could mean. The goal is to create some 
kind of acceleration around the SRI idea and to catalyze some research and development 
from different investors who are more or less advanced but who all have to comply with 
or explain their ESG objectives. (High Level Public Servant, Ministry of Finance, 
interview 72) 
As a result, when Article 173-VI and its decree were released, “there was no other way 
for asset managers and asset owners than to support Article 173-VI, even with regard to its 
climate ambitions” (Head of SRI, Asset Manager 24, interview 61). 
 
Overall Impact of Catalyzing in the Marketplace 
Overall, the synchronicity of microsteering and regulatory steering created a mainstream 
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acceptance of SRI in the French financial market by suddenly increasing both the depth and 
breadth of governmental intervention (see Figure 2). During Period 3 (2012-2017), the state 
pro-actively captured the previous trade union and state-related agencies’ efforts to create a 
label for SRI products and fast-tracked the passing of the pioneering Green Law Article 173 
regarding climate change reporting. The latter was enhanced by the prominence of ESG 
issues and the finance sector in the twenty-first conference of the parties (COP 21) and was 
confirmed by the launch of the Paris Climate Change agreement in mid-December 2015.13 In 
the space of only 4 weeks, the French state and its ministers released 3 ground-breaking 
application decrees for the public ecological transition label (10 December, 2015), Article 
173-VI (29 December, 2015), and eventually for the public SRI label (8 January, 2016). 
The consecutive development of state-owned labels through microsteering supported the 
enrolment of major market players who could not refuse the adoption of a label they had 
codesigned. As shown in Figure 1, between 2012 and 2017 and, in particular, since 2013, the 
SRI market in France grew exponentially in terms of AuM subject to ESG criteria (from €200 
to €322 billion) and the number of new SRI funds created (from 250 to 439 funds). Here, 
microsteering through the stringent public SRI label enhanced the regulatory depth of 
governmental interventions in the SRI realm. At the end of September 2018, the public SRI 
label was awarded to 166 funds from 36 asset management firms with approximately €45 
billion AuM (Eurosif, 2018). 
In parallel with the rapid adoption of the public SRI label, regulatory steering through 
Article173-VI also increased the SRI market’s regulatory breath. For instance, Novethic 
reported that, from a sample of 100 of the leading institutional investors in France, 73 asset 
owners representing €2,093 billion (or 85%) of the combined assets presented documentation 
that fully or partially complied with Article 173-VI of the 2015 French Energy Transition 
                                                 
13 See Novethic, 2018. 173 Shades of reporting, Season 2, available at: https://www.novethic.com/. 
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Act.14 Hence, as summed by one of our interviewees, the creation of the public SRI label 
aligned institutional investors’ commitment with stringent ESG objectives such as those laid 
out in Article 173-VI: 
Today, we can walk on two legs. We improve institutional investor practices with the 
173, and we provide a high visibility tool to the general public with the label. But what is 
super interesting is that it is very likely that some asset owners who want to comply with 
Article 173-VI will end up investing in funds that were awarded the public SRI label. The 
main goal of the public SRI label was, in my mind, to reach the retail market, but 
actually in the future, assets owners are likely to be the ones who will use the public SRI 
label to fulfil, at a minimum, their ESG objectives. (French Social Investment Forum, 
Staff Member, interview 77) 
In short, both governmental CSR interventions interacted to contribute to SRI 
mainstreaming within the financial market, as reflected in Figure 1, following the layering 
and catalyzing mechanisms presented in Figure 2. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, we explored how governmental CSR interventions interact to shape 
business behavior through financial markets. Through a longitudinal analysis of the French 
SRI market, we identified three modes of governmental intervention that combine elements 
of steering and rowing: Regulatory steering, delegated rowing, and microsteering. Our 
findings show how the French government’s CSR interventions interacted through two 
mechanisms: Layering, which evolved through an accumulation of complementary pieces of 
regulation, and created an informational context favorable for SRI market development 
within which actors could experiment with new technologies of governance such as SRI 
labels, and catalyzing, which combined regulatory steering and microsteering interventions to 
align market actors’ interests and behavior. Layering enabled the catalyzing of the French 
SRI market so that governmental CSR interventions triggered mainstreaming throughout the 
                                                 
14 Article first accessed in April 2019, on the International Labour Rights Forum website: 
https://laborrights.org/releases/government-bangladesh-not-ready-take-over-accord’s-safety-work. 
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market (Figure 2). 
Our study has resulted in a number of insights into the theorization of governmental CSR 
interventions in neoliberal capitalism, the analysis of the interactions of these interventions, 
the orchestration of these interventions by governments, and as the mobilization of financial 
market intermediaries to regulate CSR. We discuss these insights in more detail below before 
evaluating some of the boundary conditions of our results as well as the ethical implications 
of our study. 
 
Contributions to the Study of Governmental CSR Interventions 
Reinventing Governmental CSR Interventions: The Recombination of Steering and Rowing 
Our first contribution is to identify and label modes of governmental CSR intervention 
that question the established distinction between the steering role of government and the 
rowing role of private actors in the provision of public goods (Levi-Faur, 2005; Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992). Our results show that, in the case of the French SRI market, such roles 
became blurred as the government experimented with modes of intervention that enhanced its 
influence while remaining compatible with the neoliberal search for “low-cost” regulation. 
Although regulatory steering was privileged as a mode of governmental CSR intervention in 
France – a country where the role of the state in business affairs remains central (Schmidt, 
2016) – these interventions were focused on market construction, blurring the traditional 
roles of private and public actors. Regulatory steering interventions led to the construction of 
an informational context supportive of SRI market development (e.g., design of laws 
supporting the provision of ESG data) and the enabling of market actors’ experimentation 
with new ways of governing investor behavior (e.g., through the creation of SRI labels). 
Through such interventions, the French state could enhance its national influence on 
corporations and even extend that influence beyond the French borders, as “regulated” SRI-
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focused investors can subsequently influence investee companies globally (see also 
Vasudeva, 2013). 
However, our study significantly extends prior insights into governmental interventions 
by showing that, even in such a state-driven context as France, governments can move 
beyond steering through the active mobilization of state-owned organizations (delegated 
rowing) or the capture of labeling initiatives developed by other actors (microsteering). 
Delegated rowing and microsteering recombined rowing and steering in an unprecedented 
manner (Levi-Faur, 2005; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), as they involved the government more 
deeply without relying on a traditional “command and control” approach to regulation 
(McBarnet, 2007). These two modes of intervention further blur the roles of public and 
private actors in the CSR domain. How the French state dealt with the governmental SRI 
label provides a good illustration. The government enabled deliberations between private 
actors, specified the criteria of the label to be implemented by private investors, and defined 
which private auditors were allowed to audit this label while formally remaining the owner of 
the label. 
Interestingly, the three modes of intervention we identified can activate one or several of 
the mechanisms theorized by Schneider and Scherer (2019). For instance, governmental CSR 
interventions in France have provided market actors with ESG-related knowledge (regulatory 
steering), created massive isomorphic peer pressure by redefining the mission of state-
governed financial institutions (delegated rowing), and informed collective deliberations at 
crucial moments regarding the definition of French SRI and green labels (microsteering). As 
a whole, the portfolio of governmental CSR interventions we documented in our study shows 
that, even in a neoliberal context dominated by market mechanisms, governments can 
intervene to enhance their influence over private actors’ CSR-related behavior. Our analysis 
thus addresses the recent call for studying the mechanisms underlying governmental 
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interventions in “rapidly growing” and “new areas”, such as SRI (Kourula et al., 2019: 1117). 
 
Explaining How Governmental CSR Interventions Interact: Layering and Catalyzing 
Our second contribution relates to the interactions among governmental CSR interventions. 
Recent research has called for both the theorization of the mechanisms underlying 
governmental CSR interventions (Schneider & Scherer, 2019), and a more holistic 
understanding of how such interventions operate (Dentchev et al., 2017; Knudsen & Moon, 
2017), which can be approached by considering how interventions interact. 
Our study responds to these calls, as our analysis moves beyond a “one-by-one” 
investigation of the social mechanisms by which governmental CSR interventions operate 
(Gond et al.,  2011; Schneider & Scherer, 2019) to conceptualize the mechanisms underlying 
the interactions between these interventions, namely, layering and catalyzing. These two 
social mechanisms are consistent with the “embedded” and “agential” (Knudsen & Matten, 
2017: 15) nature of governmental CSR interventions. On the one hand, layering reflects 
governmental embeddedness within a legacy of CSR regulations, as it suggests that 
governments can accumulate regulative components of an institutional puzzle waiting to be 
assembled. In our case, there were no omniscient technocrats with a 20-year regulatory 
“grand plan”. Rather, successive governmental CSR interventions designed the pieces of a 
multisided regulatory puzzle and, in so doing, developed the breadth and depth of the French 
SRI market. On the other hand, catalyzing reflects a more agential approach to governmental 
regulation, as it involves leveraging market actors’ power through the alignment of their 
interests within a predefined regulatory context. In this regard, catalyzing consisted of French 
governmental actors purposively adding the last decisive regulatory pieces to the puzzle – 
through targeted interventions – to trigger mainstream acceptance in the market. 
Although, in our case, both mechanisms operated sequentially– with catalyzing 
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depending on pre-existing layering – we think that these mechanisms can potentially operate 
independently from each other, and we regard the precise nature of their interrelations as an 
empirical question to be explored in future studies. Methods such as fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fs-QCA) (Fiss, 2007; Misangyi et al., 2017), can help to generalize the 
analysis of how both mechanisms interact and operate across multiple contexts. In addition, 
future studies could, for example, explore how different elements of “a package” of 
governmental CSR policies (e.g., laws about ESG corporate disclosure, the SRI-focused 
regulation of state-owned pension funds, support for third parties or governmental SRI labels) 
are organized in configurations that produce specific CSR-related outcomes at the country 
level (e.g., SRI practice diffusion in a given financial market). 
As a whole, our analysis suggests that a government mindful of the interactions produced 
by its CSR interventions can “orchestrate” its policies to maximize its influence on business 
actors (Abbott et al., 2015; 2017). In line with prior political studies (Henriksen & Ponte, 
2018), we found that orchestration is relevant to making sense of the regulatory efforts of not 
only international organizations, NGOs or “weak” governments but also “strong” 
governments, such as the French government, which can and do engage in orchestration 
work; by regulating – in part – through a reliance on intermediary organizations (delegated 
rowing), or the creative capture and shaping of standards or labels (microsteering). While 
subjected to a path-dependency effect, this governmental orchestration work can be deployed 
by a cognizant government (Knudsen & Moon, 2017), which seeks to maximize the impact of 
its CSR interventions while keeping their costs down (that is, most of the rowing costs are 
covered by intermediaries). Accordingly, our results contribute to studies of orchestration 
(Abbott et al., 2015), as we show that orchestration can result from part-emerging and part-
purposive interventions that together enhance the effects produced by the coexistence of 
distinct governmental CSR interventions within the same policy mix. 
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Regulating through Financial Markets: A New Space for Governmental CSR Interventions 
Our third contribution is to study the governance of CSR in the context of financialized 
capitalism. Although scholars have mentioned the importance of considering how finance can 
shape CSR interventions (Marti & Scherer, 2016), and create boundaries for governmental 
CSR interventions (Scherer et al., 2016), financial markets are absent from prior 
conversations about government and CSR (e.g., Knudsen & Moon, 2017). 
Our analysis brings financial markets back into the scope of governmental studies of 
CSR by showing how financial markets can become a relevant space for governmental CSR 
interventions, notably through the development of robust national SRI markets that pressure 
investors, as well as their investee companies, to adopt socially responsible behavior. 
Considering financial markets is crucial given their weight in national domestic policy 
making and the restrictions that may be imposed on governmental capacities to promote CSR 
(Scherer et al., 2016). However, even though Schneider and Scherer (2019) suggest that 
intermediaries shape CSR behavior through multiple mechanisms, they do not consider the 
specific role of financial market intermediaries. 
Our analysis shows the value of recognizing the importance of crucial yet neglected 
categories of financial market intermediaries: State-owned, state-designed, and/or state-
regulated banks, pension funds and/or financial intermediaries. In the French case, through 
delegated rowing, the government has actively reoriented a major state-regulated financial 
actor – the CDC – that has itself financially supported CSR and SRI rating agencies; and the 
purposive design of SRI-focused public pension funds has also created important peer 
pressure for SRI activities in the market. Consequently, delegated rowing within the financial 
markets prepared other mainstream private financial actors for SRI acceptance, which 
occurred through further regulatory steering and microsteering types of interventions. Hence, 
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based on our analysis, we suggest that researchers pay more attention to financial 
intermediaries such as public pension funds and, in particular, sovereign wealth funds 
(Mehrpouya, 2015; Vasudeva, 2013) in future studies of CSR and governments. 
 
Transferability, Boundary Conditions and Future Research 
The French SRI context provided us with an ideal case through which to capture the 
renewal and interactions of governmental CSR interventions due to its rich legacy of legal 
frameworks and recent governmental initiatives. However, our focus on a unique empirical 
case invites us to also evaluate the transferability of our theoretical insights beyond the 
context of a given national system and its financial market. We therefore now discuss the 
context-related boundary conditions of our results, which could be further analyzed in future 
research. 
 
Orchestrating Governmental CSR Interventions in other National Business Systems 
A first boundary condition of our findings relates to the French national business system 
(NBS) (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Morgan, 2017), within which governmental CSR 
interventions were deployed through financial markets. The French case of a “state-driven” 
NBS (Schmidt, 2016) can be contrasted with a case such as South Africa – which is an NBS 
characterized by lower state dominance, reflecting the fact that it is an “emergent LME 
(liberal market economy)” (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018: 317). As in the 
French context, the South African government broke ground in terms of SRI regulatory 
steering when, in 2011, a preamble was introduced in the revised pension fund regulation 
stipulating that pension funds should integrate ESG factors in their investment decision 
making if they are deemed to be financially material (Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014). 
Previously, between 2006 and 2009, the state allowed the government employee pension 
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funds (GEPF) – one of the biggest pension funds in the world – to commit to SRI by joining 
the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) initiative and leading the creation of a local 
“responsible investment code”. The GEPF was followed by several large public and private 
pension funds and the largest asset managers in South Africa becoming PRI signatories 
(Giamporcaro, 2011). Meanwhile, the local stock exchange made it compulsory for 
companies that want to be listed to “comply or explain” with regard to the local CSR 
voluntary code known as the “King Code” (Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014). 
These first governmental CSR interventions triggered a layering mechanism: Since 2018, 
the South African financial regulatory body proposed reinforcing (regulatory steering) and 
specifying (microsteering) the exact type of ESG disclosure that should be required from 
pension funds, but initially, this would be accomplished through voluntary guidance (FSCA, 
2019). In addition, the South African government released the fourth issue of the King 
voluntary CSR code in 2016, but faithful to its liberal mindset on companies’ CSR disclosure, 
it did not announce any mandatory regulatory plan that would complement it. 
This situation provides a unique opportunity to assess whether this combination of 
regulatory steering and a light form of microsteering – by enhancing the stringency of ESG 
reporting requirements on the investor side – can suffice to reinforce the layering mechanism 
and move towards catalyzing, as in the French case and its tradition of robust mandatory 
governmental interventions. More generally, future studies could unpack in greater detail 
which aspects of state-driven NBS interact with governmental CSR interventions to explain 
mainstream acceptance in SRI markets. Using our portfolio of modes of governmental CSR 
intervention and mechanisms of interactions across SRI markets embedded in distinct NBS 
contexts could refine our framework. 
 
Orchestrating Governmental CSR Interventions beyond Financial Markets 
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Another important boundary condition of our study, relates to whether the repertoire of 
governmental CSR interventions and the related interaction mechanisms we advance, are 
relevant beyond the financial market context. To evaluate this second boundary condition, we 
discuss how our results can clarify some aspects of the orchestration of governmental CSR 
interventions in multinational corporations’ (MNCs) extended supply chains, using the now 
well-studied case of the Rana Plaza disaster (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015). To remedy the 
shocking fact that workers lost their lives due to squalid and unsafe working conditions, 
international and local unions, clothing brands, and international and local consumer activist 
movements cooperated to create the Bangladesh Accord on fire and building safety. Despite 
being a voluntary initiative, this accord is an especially “hard” form of “soft” law as it 
presents striking similarities with both regulatory steering – brand signatories can be legally 
pursued if they are in breach of their commitments – and microsteering – the accord spelled 
out in detail what needed to happen practically for worker safety to prevail. Consequently, 
this accord could be regarded as triggering – through private transnational governance – a 
catalyzing mechanism around workers’ safety, especially when it was joined by a competing 
initiative known as “The Alliance”. Both initiatives aimed to collaborate to “level the playing 
field” regarding worker safety rights in Bangladesh (Donaghey & Reinecke, 2018). 
However, neither of these initiatives managed to involve governmental actors and local 
employers, and their long-term success remains uncertain as a result (Donaghey & Reinecke, 
2018). In 2019, Bangladesh tried to take control of the accord’s auditing capacities, but 
members of the accord questioned the government’s capacity to deliver such services.15 Our 
analysis suggests that, even though these unprecedented, private, collective efforts to regulate 
CSR in MNC supply chains were successful at creating a catalyzing mechanism, ultimately, 
                                                 
15 Article first accessed in April 2019, on the International Labour Rights Forum website: 
https://laborrights.org/releases/government-bangladesh-not-ready-take-over-accord’s-safety-work. 
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their impact remained limited by the quasi-absence of prior layering through multiple 
governmental CSR interventions at the local level. This illustration highlights that, even 
outside financial markets, successful catalyzing may still remain – as in our case – path-
dependent due to prior layering. Thus, we would encourage future transnational governance 
studies to consider how local governments can be involved in the orchestration of 
transnational governance as the delegated rowing and microsteering efforts of coordinated 
market actors may be undermined or bounded by the absence of associated regulatory 
steering from local governments. 
 
Globally Orchestrating Governmental CSR Interventions  
A third important boundary condition of our analysis relates to our focus on the national, 
rather than the transnational or global, level of analysis to unpack how orchestration operates. 
Although our research captures transnational forces – through our focus on the globally 
embedded French financial market and our recognition of the role played by global factors 
(e.g., the importance of the COP 21 conference in the process of catalyzing) – we could not 
explore all of the transnational dynamics that interacted directly or indirectly with French 
governmental CSR interventions. However, the CSR and government literature has called for 
more attention to be paid to transnational forces in the study of governmental CSR 
interventions (Knudsen & Moon, 2017), and global governance scholars such as Botzem and 
Quack (2006) recognize the opportunity for governments to leverage national regulations to 
shape the transnational regulatory space. Future studies could build on these insights and our 
results to analyze how national and transnational regulative dynamics interact (see also 
Kourula et al., 2019: 1118). We notice, for instance, that several of our interviewees involved 
in the design of Article 173 were subsequently recruited to become members of the European 
Commission’s High Level Expert Group (HLEG) on sustainable finance. Furthermore, these 
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European-level discussions about sustainable finance have recently called for the creation of 
a European label for green investment products that mimics, to a large extent, prior French 
microsteering. Investigating more closely how French and European regulatory dynamics 
interacted in this case could help clarify the broader reciprocal influences of national and 
international regulatory dynamics around SRI issues. 
 
Ethical Implications of our Study 
Overall, our typology of governmental CSR interventions and our two related 
mechanisms suggest that financial markets do not necessarily operate as a burden weighing 
on firms, or governments’, capacity to deploy CSR policies, but could be leveraged for the 
sake of regulating and enhancing CSR behavior. As a result, our analysis provides a more 
nuanced picture of governmental interventions than their depiction as merely a “visible hand” 
of government restricting individuals’ freedom, but rather as one addressing collective 
concerns and the “invisible hand” of the market (Knudsen & Moon, 2017), which has 
structured discussions of business ethics and CSR for many years (e.g., Freeman, 1984; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Similar to Schneider and Scherer (2019) and, before 
them, Bowen (1953), our study regards governmental CSR interventions as also operating 
beyond the “voluntary / mandatory dichotomy” (Ruggie, 2018: 318). Microsteering, for 
instance, combines coercion and voluntarism and is aligned with the “libertarian paternalism” 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2003: 175) ideology, which has been operationalized through various 
forms of “nudging” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). As with CSR in the 1950s (see Acquier, 
Gond, & Pasquero, 2011), this (neo)liberal reinvention of governmental intervention can be 
seen as a “third way” worth exploring, but it also raises important ethical concerns in relation 
to its possible capture by technocrats who are loosely concerned with citizens’ needs and 
priorities. 
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Although our narrative shows that successive French governments have managed to 
nudge mainstream financial actors towards adopting SRI practices, the French social 
movement of gilets jaunes acts as a reminder of the obvious ethical limitations of purely top-
down modes of political governance that can be misaligned with citizens’ most pressing 
human and social needs.16 Future studies could combine our framework with social 
movement theory (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2006) to further conceptualize the ethical 
antecedents of governmental CSR interventions and the bottom-up processes by which 
society’s problems can be “listened to”, “translated” and “interpreted” correctly (Valiorgue & 
Roulet, 2018) to design relevant governmental CSR regulations. 
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16 The Gilet Jaunes (literally: “yellow vests”) movement is a social movement that emerged in France at the end 
of 2018, to protest against the French government’s decision to increase fuel prices in order to abide by its 
environmental commitments. In 2019, the movement did not slow down, and the French government organized 
a national deliberation at the beginning of the year to discuss the social challenges encountered by French 
citizens. For further details, see, for example, the interview of Bruno Latour (in French) accessible at: 
https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/le-7-9/le-7-9-18-janvier-2019. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the Development of the French SRI Market (1997-2017) 
 
Source: 1) 1997-2001: Muet et al. (2001) report, and secondary sources for the number of funds; and 2) 2003-2018: 2a) Novethic (2003 to 2015) – annual survey of SRI in 
France, and survey on different perimeters for the AuM. 2b) Since 2016, Novethic produces a more focused survey of “so-called” high-impact SRI funds, i.e. SRI funds that 
obey the strictest definition and standards of SRI practices. Please note: We do not report the SRI AuM for the years 2016-2018, because Novethic has changed its perimeters 
of SRI evaluation. We thank Novethic for their support in checking the figures used to build this graphic.  
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Figure 2. Mechanisms Explaining the Interactions of Governmental CSR Interventions 
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Table 1: Definition and Complementary Illustrations for the Three Modes of Governmental CSR Intervention 
Modes of intervention  Mini-cases examples Citations  from asset managers and state-related authorities  
REGULATORY STEERING 
Governmental intervention through 
the promulgation of laws and 
application decrees, by which states 
and ministries directly shape actor 
behavior; but without specifying 
predefined sanctions. 
Article 173-VI of the Green Growth Law (law 
passed in August, 2015, and Application decree 
December, 2015). Article 173-VI extends the 
perimeter of Article 224 of the Grenelle II 
Environment Law (2014). Article 224 required 
asset managers to disclose how they take ESG 
issues into account in their annual report and on 
their website. Article173-VI, advanced this by 
requiring asset managers and asset owners, to now  
disclose their contribution to the green energy 
transition in addition to how their ESG investment 
policies are being implemented; in their annual 
report, and directly to their clients/beneficiaries.  
The 173-VI amendment was passed at 2am in the morning but we [MPs] did it right. […] We 
organized a conference at the Parliament with powerful financial actors already convinced 
of the relevance of what we were trying to impose. [...] The pressure was full steam [ahead] 
on the Minister of Finance to get an application decree that will operationalize the law 
without killing its spirit. (Member of Parliament, interview 73) 
What is happening with SRI is that it is designed incrementally. It was built step by step. The 
Article 173 cannot be fully understood without articulating it with what was done with the 
225 and 224 of the Grenelle Environmental Law. What we put in the 176-VI; the base was 
already in the 224, we just extended it. (High Public Servant, Ministry of Finance, 
interview 72) 
Laws can be good because it puts everybody in the right order for moving in the same 
direction, but in the meantime it cannot be too constraining if it is to work. The Article 173-
VI, it is aligning everybody, but it leaves asset managers to decide, based on where they are 
right now, what they should do. (Head of Communication, Asset Manager 20, interview 51) 
DELEGATED ROWING 
Governmental intervention that relies 
on the mobilization of state-led or 
state owned organisations to 
indirectly make market actors change 
their behavior. This can occur 
through the pooling of financial, 
political and/or institutional 
resources, to create or reform new 
state led or state owned organizations. 
The CDC is the state-owned investment group, 
whose CEO is chosen by the French president in 
office. Over the 20-year period observed, CDC 
provided support to the newly created public 
retirement funds FRR and ERAFP. The CDC also 
financially supported the creation of Novethic, its 
subsidiary dedicated to providing SRI research, 
including an SRI label. In 2008, the Economic 
Modernisation Act affirmed the role of the CDC as 
a SRI investor. The same year, IRCANTEC, 
another public pension fund managed by CDC, also 
became a SRI investor. 
In terms of businesses, these are the public investors, such as CDC, FRR, ERAFP and now 
IRCANTEC, who have indirectly pushed for SRI, and make things progress the most. (Head 
of SRI, Asset Manager 26, interview 63) 
Public asset owners today do not operate like at the beginning [of the SRI market 
development]. They are becoming good at it. They can spot when something does not add-up 
in what we tell them. For some of them, this is basically [asking us] 300 questions on our 
SRI approaches. (SRI Product Specialist, Asset Manager 11, interview 59) 
When we assess our asset managers, we assess them on their abilities to customise their SRI 
approach to our needs. We are more interested in the way they can actually implement our 
SRI principles than in their general management approach. (ESG Analysts, Asset Owner 2, 
interview 69)  
MICROSTEERING 
Governmental intervention that 
involves the government’s active 
mobilization of a soft ‘technology of 
governance’, such as labels, standards 
or awards, that micromanage actor 
behavior. 
The public SRI label. In January, 2016, after 4 
years of deliberation with public and private 
stakeholders, the public SRI label application 
decree was released by the Ministry of Finance, and 
the Novethic label launched in 2009 was 
discontinued. The public SRI label brand is the 
property of the French state, and is administered by 
the Ministry of Finance.  
The Novethic label was good, but for a label to be actually recognized by the general public, 
you need to have the state authorities directly involved. The State needs to be involved in the 
monitoring and the control, otherwise it is going to be difficult for an SRI label to truly exist. 
Time will tell if we were right. (Head of SRI, Asset Manager 24, interview 61) 
The public SRI label was really inspired by Novethic’s work. In my view, there are two big 
wins with the SRI label. The fact that there is a recognition that SRI is a specific type of 
asset management style that cannot, for example, use financial derivative instruments. The 
second win is that there is a requirement to get asset managers to measure their ESG 
impact. I hope now that the governance of the public SRI label will work just fine. (High 
Public Servant, Ministry of Environment, interview 71) 
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Table 2. Overview of Governmental CSR interventions on the French SRI market: Effects and Mechanisms (1997-2017)* 
Modes of governmental 
CSR intervention 
Period 1: Designing the French SRI regulatory 
springboard (1997-2007) 
Period 2: Regulatory extension and mainstream 
appropriation (2008-2011) 
Period 3: Triggering a SRI ‘big-bang’  
through regulation (2012-2017) 
Regulatory 
Steering 
Main 
actions 
 Law on voluntary employee savings requires 
AM disclosure of E&S information 
 NRE law requires E&S disclosure for listed 
companies (2001) 
 Creation of  a public pension fund (FRR) with 
E&S disclosure requirements, and creation of 
the ERAPF 
 Economic Modernisation Act affirms the role of 
CDC as a ‘long-term investor’ 
 IRCANTEC public pension scheme is to be 
managed by the CDC 
 Grenelle II law 2010 and Application Decrees 
of Articles 224 & 225 of the Grenelle II Law 
(2012) 
 MoE conference and ‘roadmap’ outlining that – 
“a public SRI label” will be developed  and  
follow-up white paper suggesting that this label 
can help finance the ‘ecological transition’ 
 Green Growth Law Articles 173-VI & 173-IV 
are introduced (2015) 
Effects  Creation of a ‘voluntary employees savings’ 
market with trade union involvement  
 Trade union involvement in ERAPF governance 
 French MNCs to report on ESG, which supports 
the creation of a market for CSR ratings 
 
 Article 224 pushes all French AMs to disclose 
in their annual report, and on their website: (a) 
their strategy for ESG criteria integration and 
(b) how they exercise their voting rights 
 Article 225 extends the obligation to report on 
E&S issues to unlisted companies 
 SRI label and TEEC label supported respectively 
by MoE and MoF 
 173-VI requires 840 French AOs to report on 
their ESG activities, particularly associated with 
climate change; 173-IV extends this and specifies 
reporting about ESG issues for listed companies 
Delegated 
Rowing 
Main 
actions 
 CDC invests in Arese and then Vigeo  
 CDC creates its subsidiary Novethic 
 FRR and ERAFP develop their  SRI activity  
 IRCANTEC adopts an SRI approach for all 
assets classes  
 ERAPF and FRR develop internal SRI 
competencies and widen SRI mandates ( more 
asset classes; engagement)  
 FRR, IRCANTEC, ERAFP and CDC commit to 
disclose their carbon footprint by December, 
2015  
Effects  First CSR rating agency supports the emergence 
of an SRI fund market 
 Novethic provides SRI-related market data 
 AMs and CSR rating agencies develop SRI 
competencies to attract AOs  
 Public AOs push SRI market growth by offering 
sizeable mandates 
 AMs and CSR rating agencies continue to 
professionalize to attract AOs  
 Enrolment of leading AMs and private AOs 
around carbon disclosure and the fight against 
climate change  
 SRI AMs and AOs make a commitment to 
support the implementation of Article 173-VI 
Microsteering Main 
actions 
 Creation of the CIES label by trade unions, 
stipulating that AMs should have internal SRI 
resources, and use diversified ESG information 
in their investment decision-making 
 Creation of the Novethic SRI label  that requires 
full ESG disclosure on portfolio holdings, and a 
cap on derivatives use 
 Design of Novethic’s Green label 
 The public SRI label imposes a 20% exclusion 
rate; and emergence of ESG impact reporting  
 The TEEC label excludes nuclear energy and 
promotes ‘Green Growth’ 
Effects  AMs hire internal ESG analysts and diversify 
sources of ESG information in use 
 92 funds (out of 121 applicants) obtained the 
Novethic SRI label 
 AMs implement the label requirements 
 The two governmental labels (TEEC and SRI) 
are launched, and the Novethic SRI label and 
Green Label are discontinued   
Interventions producing 
the most crucial effects 
Regulatory Steering & Delegated Rowing Microsteering & Regulatory Steering 
Mechanisms LAYERING MECHANISM CATALYZING MECHANISM 
* Abbreviations: AFG: Association française de gestion financière; AMs: asset managers; AOs: asset owners; AuM: assets under management; CDC: Caisse des dépôts et consignations; CIES: Comité intersyndical de 
l’épargne salariale; CSR: corporate social responsibility; ERAPF: Établissement de la retraite additionnelle pour la fonction publique, E&S: environmental and social; ESG: environmental, social and governance; 
FRR: fonds de réserve des retraites; MoE: Ministry of Environnment; MoF: Ministry of Finance; NRE: Nouvelle régulation économique; SRI: Socially responsible investment; TEEC: The energy and ecological 
transition for climate;  UCIT: Undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities. Color code: The cells corresponding to the most crucial effects in the process of SRI market development are in grey. 
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Appendix A – Details of Data Collection 
Data source Use in analysis 
Historical and secondary data 
1. Newspaper articles: 
Systematic collection (through the Nexis database), of more than 400 newspaper articles related to 
the French SRI market for the period 1997 to 2017. Including all articles mentioning ‘socially 
responsible investment’, ‘ethical investment’, ‘sustainable investment’, or the SRI, RI (responsible 
investment), ESG, acronyms, in all major French newspapers (Le Monde; Le Monde 
Diplomatique; Le Figaro; Libération; Le Point; L’Express); as well as in specialised economic 
press (Les Echos; La Tribune).  
2. Quantified information about the French SRI market: 
28 Novethic reports from 2002 to 2019: 
 22 ‘Novethic Indicators’; 2 ‘Novethic Barometers’; 
 1 ‘Highlights of the French SRI market’; 
 2 ‘Figures of RI in France’ 
 2 ‘Indicators on High Impact SRI’; 
 Other  timely Novethic reports on specific asset classes (e.g., bonds), financial products 
(e.g.green funds), and services providers (CSR rating agencies), provided complementary 
ESG performance indicators.  
8 EuroSIF bi-annual studies (from 2003 to 2018), including all sections on French SRI and key 
figures. 
Data provided by the magazine: Alternatives Economiques (provided in two special editions of 
“The Ethical Funds Guide” 2001 & 2003). 
3. Legal texts 
Full set of legal texts related to SRI, ESG and CSR in France for the period 1997 to 2017, publicly 
available on the website Legifrance. 
Governmental reports about the development of SRI in France: 
 Muet, Bayard, & Pannier-Runacher (2002) Rapport d’Enquête sur la Finance Socialement 
Responsable et la Finance Solidaire. Inspection Générale des Finances. N°2001-M-044–
01. Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances; 
 Dron (2013) White Paper on Financing Ecological Transition; 
 Brovelli, Drago, & Molinié (2013) report, Organizational Responsibility and 
Performance. Twenty Proposals to Reinforce CSR Approaches. 
Ministry of Environment public documentation: Roadmap for the Ecological Transition (2012); 
Operational Dashboard of the Roadmap for the Ecological Transition (2014 & 2015); and 
Ministries of Finance and Environment (2015) public documentation relating to the Public SRI 
Label and the TEEC label SRI Benchmark 
 To reconstruct the evolution of the French SRI market through key metrics 
(Figure 1), and identify key periods of market development. 
 To construct and validate a complete, detailed chronology of the key events in the 
French SRI industry between 1997 and 2017. 
 Identify and build a chronology of all governmental CSR interventions between 
1997 and 2017 (Table 2). 
 Analyze the main changes and impacts related to governmental CSR interventions. 
 Triangulate empirical evidence from interviews about the evolution and impact of 
governmental interventions. 
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4. Reports & press releases from professional associations, thinktanks & consultants 
Think tank and consultant reports evaluating the impact of SRI-related laws: 2 business 
association reports (AFG & FIR); 3 thinktank reports (Novethic Report 2016; 2017; 2018); 
and 2 NGO (WWF) reports on Article 173-VI implementation. 
Professional business association reports on SRI: French Market Authorities (2015); European 
Fund and Asset Management Association (2011; 2016). 
State related-pension funds SRI press releases, reports and publications: FRR (31 press releases 
2005-2017; 5 reports 2009-2017); ERAFP (57 press releases 2004-2017; 21 reports 2005-
2017); IRCANTEC (14 publications 2017-2015); and CDC (9 reports 2008-2017). 
Trade union and above stakeholder press releases, declarations and open letters relating to the 
CIES label, Novethic labels, and public SRI label (2001-2017). 
5. Prior academic & professional accounts of the French SRI market 
24 research articles, PhD dissertations and books, on the French SRI market covering 1997 to 
2019, published in French or English-speaking academic journals. 
10 articles and books published by French SRI practitioners (covering 2001-2018). 
 Analyse the main changes and impacts related to governmental CSR interventions. 
 Triangulate empirical evidence from interviews about the evolution and impact of 
governmental CSR interventions. 
 
Interviews 
78 semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the development of the French SRI 
market . Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 7 hours (a full working day). Please see 
Appendix B for more details about our interviewees. The interview campaign covered the whole 
period of the study: 
 48 interviews conducted between 2000 and 2012 (covering 1997-2011; and retrospective 
interviews in 2000-2001 for the early stage of SRI emergence); 
 30 interviews conducted between 2012 and 2017 (covering 2012-2017). 
 First round of abductive data coding to identify whether ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ 
were relevant conceptual categories to interpret governmental CSR interventions 
deployed over the 20 year research period. 
 Second round of inductive interview data coding to document and refine three 
types of governmental CSR interventions: ‘Regulatory steering’, ‘delegated 
rowing’, and ‘microsteering’. 
 Third round of abductive coding of both sets of interviews to validate the 
emerging mechanisms of ‘layering’ and ‘catalyzing’. 
 Triangulation with secondary data to validate the 20 year chronology, the  
governmental CSR intervention typologies and the identified social mechanisms. 
Participant observation 
The first author’s work at an organization monitoring the development of SRI in France between 
2002 and 2008, which included frequent face-to-face meetings with asset managers 
(approximately 15 one-hour meetings per year, amounting to more than 100 hours)  
First author’s participation in several key discussions related to the design and structure of French 
pension funds between 2002 and 2007 (30 hours). 
Authors’ participation in major annual, national (French) and international RI-related events: 
French Asset Management Association events; French Social Investment Forum (2001-2017); 
Novethic events (2002-2007); French asset manager workshops (2002-2007); Triple Bottom 
Line conferences (2004-2005); UN-PRI annual conferences (2013-2018). 
 To develop a deep knowledge of French SRI developments and build long-term 
relationships with key actors through informal conversations. 
 To identify and document the role played by the French government and 
governmental agencies (e.g., CDC) in the development of the French SRI market. 
 To sample our interviewees and obtain access to key ‘insiders’ who were directly 
involved in the production of governmental CSR interventions in France. 
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Appendix B – List of interviewees 
1997-2011 (Layering) – 48 interviews with 32 organizations 2012-2017 (Catalyzing) – 30 interviews with 22 organizations 
Asset Managers Asset Managers 
Nb. Organization Title (generic) Length Nb. Organization Title (generic) Length 
1 ABF (AM 1) Fund manager 1h00 49 AG2R (AM 2) Head of SRI 1h00  
2 AG2R (AM 2) SRI Analyst 2h10 50 AMUNDI (AM 20) Head of ESG & 
CG 
1h30 
3 BP (AM 3) Fund Manager 1h00 51 AMUNDI (AM 20) Head of 
Communication 
1h00 
4 BFT Gestion (AM 4) Fund Manager 1h00 52 AXA IM (AM 21) Head of CG 40mn 
5 BNP PAM (AM 5) Fund Manager 1h00 53 AXA IM (AM 21) Head of SRI 1h00 
6 BNP PAM (AM 5) Head of SRI 2h00 54 BNP Paribas (AM 5) Head of ESG 
Engagement 
1h30 
7 CAAM (AM 6) Fund Manager 2h00 55 BNP Paribas (AM 5) Head of SRI 1h30 
8 Caisses d’Épargne (AM 7) Fund Manager 30mn 56 ECOFI Invest. (AM 22) Head of R&D 1h00 
9 CLAM (AM 8) Fund Manager 1h00 57 Fédéral Finance 
(AM 23) 
Head of SRI 40mn 
10 Crédit Coopératif (AM 9) Fund Manager 1h00 58 HSBC (AM 11) Head of ESG 1h10 
11 Credit Cooperatif (AM 9) Fund Manager 1h00 59 HSBC (AM 11) SRI Specialist 2h00 
12 Groupama (AM 10) Fund Manager 1h10 60 Mirova (AM 24) Head of SRI 55mn 
13 HSBC (AM 11) Fund Manager 2h00 61 Mirova (AM 24) Head of SRI 1h20mn 
14 HSBC (AM 11) Fund Manager 2h00 62 Sycomore (AM 25) Head of SRI 55mn 
15 IDEAM (AM 12) Bond Fund 
Manager 
1h00 63 Edmond de Rothschild 
(AM 26) 
Head of SRI 1h00 
16 IDEAM (AM 12) Fund Manager 1h00 Public bodies and related (e.g., public asset owners) 
17 IDEAM (AM 12) Head of SRI 3h00 64 CDC Head of SRI 30mn 
18 IDEAM (AM 12) SRI Analyst 2h00 65 Financial Market 
Authorities (AMF) 
AM team (5 
interviewees) 
1h00 
19 IONIS (AM 13) SRI Analyst 1h30 66 FRR (AO 1) Head of RI 1h00 
20 Macif Gestion (AM 14) Fund Manager & 
CEO 
2h30 67 FRR (AO 1) Head of RI 1h40 
21 Meeschaert (AM 15) Fund Manager 2h00 68 FRR (AO 1) Head of RI 55mn 
22 Meeschaert (AM 15) SRI Analyst 2h30 69 ERAFP (AO 2) ESG Analysts (2 
interviewees) 
1h40 
23 Prado Epargne (AM 16) SRI Analyst 40mn 70 IRCANTEC (AO 3) Head of RI 1h20 
24 Sarasin Expertise (AM 17) Fund Manager 1h00 71 Ministry of 
Environment 
High Level 
Public Servant   
2h00 
25 Sogeposte (AM 18) Fund Manager 1h00 72 Ministry of Finance High Level 
Public Servant 
1h40 
26 Sogeposte (AM 18) SRI Analyst 1h00 73 Government Member of 
Parliament 
30mn 
27 UBS (AM 19) Fund Manager 40mn 74 Novethic Employee 30mn 
Public bodies and related (e.g., state-owned rating agency) 75 Novethic CEO 1h00 
28 CDC & Novethic CEO 40mn Other stakeholders (e.g., academics, professional bodies) 
29 CDC Technical Expert 30mn 76 Academic Professor 30 min  
30 Arese CEO 1h00 77 French Social 
Investment Forum 
Staff member 1h30  
31 Arese (now Vigeo), at the 
time owned 50% by CDC 
ESG Analyst 1h00 78 Trade Union Representative of 
the CIES 
1h50  
32 Arese (now Vigeo) at the 
time owned 50% by CDC 
ESG Analyst 1h00  
TOTAL: 78 interviews 
 
KEY: 
AM: Asset Managers 
AO: Asset Owners  
CG: Corporate Governance 
ESG: Environment, Social and Governance 
SRI: Socially Responsible Investment  
RI: Responsible Investment 
 
CITATION: 
The bold numbers in the left column are the ones used when we 
cite interviewees in the manuscript. 
33 Arese (now Vigeo) at the 
time owned 50% by CDC 
ESG Analyst 1h00 
34 Arese (now Vigeo) at the 
time owned 50% by CDC 
Head of Research 7h00 
35 Vigeo (former Arese) ESG Analyst 1h30 
36 Vigeo (former Arese) ESG Analyst 1h30 
37 Vigeo (former Arese) ESG Analyst 1h30 
38 Vigeo (former Arese) ESG Analyst 1h30 
Other stakeholders (e.g., consultants, professional bodies) 
39 French Bank (CAC 40) Head of CSR 1h00 
40 CIC-Securities (Broker) Head of SRI 2h30 
41 Consultant (French)  CSR expert 1h00 
42 Consultant (US-based) CSR expert 45mn 
43 AFG-ASSFI (AM prof. 
association) 
Director 1h00 
44 Core Ratings ESG Analyst 2h00 
45 CFIE (shareholder activist) Director 2h00 
46 Insurance Company Head CSR 1h00 
47 Standard and Poor’s Financial Analyst 30min 
48 United-Nations Former Arese & 
Novethic expert 
1h00 
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